Gli attanti metaversali come soggetti di diritto. Brevi riflessioni a partire da John R. Searle.

Among the countless foundational questions regarding the Metaverse, one stands out: Can an avatar be endowed with legal subjectivity? This research aims to answer this question by applying the theoretical paradigm of the philosopher John R. Searle “X counts as Y in C.” In other words, is it possible for an avatar (X, which is already Y in a previous status function) to be considered a legal subject (Y) in the legal context of metaverse (C)? The primary focus – with reference to criminal liability profiles – will be on what we will refer to as NPCs [Non-Player Characters/Non-Playable Characters], that is, avatars driven by AI [Artificial Intelligence]. After briefly focusing on some of the most well-known and long-standing fictiones iuris, such as the concepts of “natural person” and “legal person”, which reveal the historical flexibility of the law, we will delve into J.R. Searle’s paradigm. Consequently, we will explore the hypothesis of a quid pluris that could render metaversal “actants” legally qualifiable as subjects of law, akin to legal entities ex d.lgs. 231/2001.