Diritto e speranza. Una riflessione giusfilosofica su Habermas, Alexy e Dworkin.

This article proffers an analysis of hope as a philosophical category, with the aim of providing an epistemological basis for the study and understanding of a normative theory of law. Rather than being a concept limited to theology, philosophical and political reflection on hope broadens the theoretical and practical scope of legal thought. To explore this topic in greater depth, the article revisits the key points of contemporary philosophical discourse: from Catherine Malabou’s reinterpretation of Kantian epigenesis to Ernst Bloch’s utopian messianism, via Max Horkheimer’s theological turn and, finally, Walter Benjamin’s more radically deconstructive position. Starting from these premises, the analysis moves on to the three main legal theories of the late 20th century: Habermas, Alexy, and Dworkin. Habermas’ communicative rationality is the basis of a procedural approach that channels law toward justice. Alexy’s ‘claim to correctness’ links legal rationality to normative legitimacy. With his ‘law thesis’, Dworkin in turn proposes a vision of law in which every judicial decision entails ethical and political responsibility. In all three of these thinkers, law appears as a rational but not neutral enterprise, constantly shaped by the need to justify its claims within a framework of shared meaning. It is precisely in this space of reflexivity and its inherent rhythm that hope finds its place as a means of thorough and blow-by blow progress (La Torre): which, conseqeuntly, leads to a discursive dynamic capable of improving legal experience as a whole, but at the same time in a concrete and case-appropriate manner.