Il diritto difettivo e difettoso. Per una lettura apofatica del dire giuridico

Today, law permeates and codifies almost all human action. Where there is human action, there is generally a way of doing it according to the law. The law therefore claims to be all-inclusive and passes off itself as an omnipresent and almost omnipotent social device, the content of which everyone must know by virtue of the ‘ignorantia legis non excusat’ principle. This long-term ‘propaganda operation’ has borne fruit insofar as ordinary people believe that almost all the answers can be found in the law, answers that it loudly demands, continually claiming ‘rights’ (be they true or only presumed).
But does the law actually manage to give all the answers it promises? Or is it likely to cause irreparable damage when it intervenes in fields for which it does not have the right means, neither cognitive nor technical, to be effective? Is this perhaps one of its dark sides? To put the same question roughly: does this darkness not coincide with the fact that law’s omnipotence turns out to be nothing more than a big bluff? And therefore, camouflages a defectiveness of law? This paper proposes a working hypothesis starting from the perspective of an apophatic conception of the understanding of law.